Can biased information persuade in the long run? Political information on Italian TV has been biased towards Berlusconi's party since 1994. We exploit a shock to viewers' exposure to Berlusconi bias: idiosyncratic deadlines to switch to digital TV from 2008 to 2012. Digital TV increased the number of freeview channels tenfold. As a consequence, viewership of Berlusconi-controlled channels by digital users dropped by 19% from 2008 to 2010 elections. Although the control of most pre-digital outlets by Berlusconi was widely known, the switch caused a drop in his coalition vote share by 5.5 to 7.5 percentage points. The effect was stronger in towns with older and less educated voters. At least 30% of digital users had not filtered out the bias from 1994 to 2010. Moving to digital TV affected voting via turnout: previous Berlusconi supporters went to vote less than others, hence his vote share dropped. We discuss several Bayesian interpretations, and argue that they cannot fully explain these results. Coarse thinking, selective attention, and persuasion bias are broadly consistent with the evidence. * Bank of Italy and RCEA.
I Introduction
There is growing evidence that exposure to biased information persuades decision-makers. This is true in several domains, such as political information in the media (DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) , Enikolopov et al. (2011) ), financial analyst forecasts (Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2007) ), and product advertisements (Meyers-Levy and Malaviya (1999) ).
But is persuasion sustainable in the long run? And if so, why do individuals not filter out systematic biases over time?
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To address these questions, we consider the long-lived bias towards Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in political information on Italian TV. For 10 years during the period 1994-2011, Berlusconi has controlled six out of seven national channels, due to his dual role as a media tycoon and Prime minister.
2 Durante and Knight (2012) document the existence of a bias in terms of time and quality of coverage of Berlusconi's party and opponents.
We exploit a quasi-random shock to the biased TV exposure of Italian viewers:
idiosyncratic deadlines to forcely switch from analog to digital TV from 2008 to 2012.
At the deadlines, old analog signals were switched off, and only digital signals kept on airing. Digital TV improved transmission efficiency, and increased the number of free national channels tenfold. Most digital channels are aired by new media companies, which have no ties to Berlusconi. After switching to digital TV, many Italian households changed their viewing habits: from June 2008 to June 2011, the share of viewers of Berlusconi-controlled channels dropped from 84% to 71%. Over the same period, viewers of new channels increased from 2% to 17%.
3 Switch-off deadlines were spatially heterogenous, and largely idiosyncratic to the purposes of our analysis. European Union legislation imposed the move to digital TV. National legislation established dates for Italian regions based on similarity of infrastructures built in the 1950s, and to guarantee a homogeneous move for the North, Center and South of the country. We employ a spatial regression discontinuity strategy to estimate the causal 1 Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and DellaVigna and Kaplan (2006) discuss Bayesian persuasion in the short run, and non-Bayesian persuasion in the long run.
2 In other years, he directly controlled three channels, and influenced the others through the executives he had appointed when Prime Minister.
3 The total number of viewers over this period was about constant (95% of Italian households). Those who did not watch old channels or new digital TV were on satellite TV, which we discuss below. we estimate that at least 30% of them changed their voting behavior after the switch off of analog TV. We interpret this as a lower bound for the ratio of voters who do not filter out biases in political information over time, since non-Berlusconi supporters may be subject to biases towards opposition parties which our design does not capture.
We then investigate which demographics stopped supporting Berlusconi once on digital TV. We find that Berlusconi candidate vote share dropped the most in towns with older and less educated voters. On the contrary, towns with more (less) youngsters, or towns with higher (lower) social capital did not behave different from other towns. We show that switching to digital TV affected voting behavior via turnout: turnout dropped after the shock, especially in towns where voters were older and less educated. This suggests that many of his previous supporters did not vote in 2010. In treated towns with a ratio of elderly over total population one standard deviation above the mean, turnout dropped by one quarter of a standard deviation more, and Berlusconi candidate vote share dropped by one third of a standard deviation more than in other treated towns.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper which documents that persuasion by a biased sender can be sustained in the long run, even if all receivers are aware of the bias. We discuss plausible interpretations of these results. We argue that negative news omission, positive news omission, agenda setting, rational inattention, overlapping generations, changes in political advertising, changes in voters preferences, and lower political knowledge are unlikely to fully explain them. At the same time, coarse thinking with limited memory, selective attention and persuasion bias seem broadly consistent with our evidence.
This paper falls within the literatures on persuasion in economics (DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2010) , and media and political outcomes (Prat and Stromberg, 2011) . Besley and Prat (2006) and Anderson and MacLaren (2012) show that media bias may affect rational agents who do not know when information is omitted. 6 In the Internet Appendix, we show that our effect is not driven by positive or negative omitted information. Also, Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) derive conditions for a biased signal by a sender to persuade a Bayesian receiver to take an action favorable to the sender. In our setting, voters are systematically persuaded over time. They consistently take actions they would have not taken without bias exposure, as revealed by their choices once exposure drops. Empirical research on media and voting includes Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) , who argue that media slant emerges from media outlets responding to audience preferences, which are biased towards likely-minded news. document an effect of newspapers opening and closing on electoral turnout, but no effect of newspaper slant on candidate vote shares. In this paper, turnout drops more in towns where the effect of the shock to bias exposure is stronger.
As in DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) and Enikolopov et al. (2011) , we show that media bias affects voting behavior. We are different insofar as we look at lower exposure to a long-lived, pervasive bias, instead of higher exposure to a new biased outlet. 7 This allows to test if persuasion can be sustained in the long run, even if the bias is systematic and every voter is aware of it. Since virtually all Italians were exposed to the bias before digital TV, we can estimate the ratio of voters who were systematically persuaded over time, and determine which demographics were most affected. Finally, the effect we document has the potential to change election outcomes.
This paper also relates to Durante and Knight (2012) . They look at viewers response to change in partisanship of government-controlled media when Berlusconi becomes Prime
Minister. The bias towards Berlusconi increases when he serves as Prime Minister. Some viewers sort into leftish outlets based on ideological preferences. Viewers with leftish ideological preferences sort, but they are not responsive to the bias in the first place. On the contrary, switching to digital TV involves all viewers, including those who support
Berlusconi.
Digital TV viewers sort into all-entertainment channels, but not into news programs. Gentzkow (2006) and Prior (2005) show that once television and cable TV, respectively, become available to US viewers, some of them stop watching news programs and sort into entertainment programs. This reduces their political knowledge and turnout at elections.
The channel we document is similar, but our effect is not entirely explained by lower knowledge or interest in politics. For this to hold, Berlusconi supporters must be more likely than others to move to new channels. But then, we should observe a larger effect in towns where historical support for Berlusconi was higher. On the contrary, we find that the effect was larger in towns with lower historical support. We interpret this as evidence of peer effects in voters' updating of beliefs about Berlusconi and his party, in line with evidence in Cialdini (1984) and with the model of Murphy and Shleifer (2004) .
We provide a motive for increasing competition in the TV industry when information sources are biased, and the bias does not consist of news omission. Higher competition reduces bias exposure, helping individuals to debias mechanically. This is different from 7 Enikolopov et al. (2011) look at the effect of availability of a non-governmental outlet, NTV, from 1996 to 1999 and 2003 general elections. The acquisition of NTV by a state-controlled company after 1999 and before 2003 equalizes candidates coverage before 2003. Hence, length of exposure is at most 7 years. Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) , who show that competition reduces the extent of bias in financial analysts' reports, to which investors are always exposed 8 .
In the rest of the paper, Section 2 describes the institutional setting, while Section 3 gives evidence on Italian households' reaction to the switch to digital TV. In Section 4, we discuss our identification strategy and the data we use. Section 5 presents the empirical results and tests their robustness. In Section 6 we interpret the magnitude of the effect we find, and discuss plausible explanations for it. In Section 7, we investigate which demographics mediate the long run effect of persuasion, and we estimate how many households have been systematically persuaded over time. Section 8 investigate the debiasing mechanism, and Section 9 concludes.
II Institutional Setting
Television in Italy. From the 1950s onwards, Italian TV has been airing on an analog infrastructure. The analog system consisted of seven channels airing nationwide, plus several local channels. National channels belonged to three networks: (i) Rai
Radiotelevisione Italiana, the government-owned network, with three channels: Rai Decoders can be bought for as low as $30. Still, to ensure wealth constraints did not prevent households from going digital, the government supported purchases by low income households.
10 The popular show Forum hosted a small entrepreneur from Abruzzo, hit by a devastating earthquake in 2008. She thanked Berlusconi's administration for their help, and attacked local politicians (from opposition parties) A few hours later, the lady admitted she was an actress, and she had followed a script provided by the show authors. our results. We also show that the incapacitation channel is unlikely to be relevant in our setting.
Panel B of Figure I plots the viewing share of new digital channels in March 2010
based on their content. The majority of households sorted into entertainment for kids or channels airing old movies and TV shows. Viewing shares in Panel B are daily averages for the time slot 6:30pm to 8:30pm, during which two major news programs on biased channels are aired, Tg1 and Tg5. In the Internet Appendix, we show that the viewing shares of these news programs have dropped by the same amount gained by new digital channels, therefore ruling out that these changes are explained by an increase in overall TV consumption after the switch. We also show that the move from news to entertainment channels was not paralleled by sorting into alternative information sources, such as newspapers or the internet.
Overall, evidence suggests that after the switch, habits changed in a way which should have not affected the voting behavior of viewers who had filtered out the Berlusconi bias in information over the years. 16 The ratio is below 100% in Campania and Lazio because we exclude satellite TV users. After the deadline, satellite users needed a decoder to access digital TV. They could have stayed on satellite TV only, which includes all-entertainment channels, hence it is similar to digital TV for our purposes.
allow to isolate voting behavior just a few months before and after switch off deadlines.
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The share of votes for region Lazio has been corrected as described in the Internet Appendix, since Berlusconi party was excluded in Rome for administrative reasons.
Berlusconi party vote share dropped the most in all-digital regions after the switch off wave of Autumn 2009.
18 If we use the percent change of Berlusconi party vote share to account for heterogenous ideologies across regions, the difference between all-digital and other regions is even more apparent. Hence, either three idiosyncratic shocks caused a drop in Berlusconi vote shares in those regions, they were unrelated to digital TV usage, and they did not affect any other regions, or this evidence suggests a link between digital TV usage and Berlusconi electoral performance.
IV Identification Strategy and Data
Spatial RDD. Our identification strategy is based on a quasi-random experiment:
idiosyncratic deadlines to switch from analog to digital TV in Italy around March 2010
Regional Elections. Near the switch off date, the probability that households are on digital TV jumps to about one. Voters who switch before elections are less exposed to Berlusconi bias than voters who switch after elections. This is supported by evidence in Figure I . Figure III Being a switch off town is a deterministic and discontinuous function of distance from a one-dimensional threshold, the border between Western and Eastern Piedmont. We exploit the spatial distribution of observations by estimating the effect of moving to digital TV on voting behavior in a regression discontinuity setting. 19 We estimate variations of the following baseline regression specification: 
20
Identification is based on three assumptions: i) all observable (and unobservable) characteristics vary smoothly at the treatment border, except the treatment; ii) the estimated effects are driven by observations close to the border, where control towns are plausible counterfactuals for treated towns; iii) there is no strategic sorting around the border.
We examine the plausibility of assumption i) in Table I , which reports summary statistics for electoral and socio-demographic characteristics at the town level. 21 Each Panel of Moving on to assumption ii), we would ideally rely on non-parametric regression discontinuity techniques using only observations very close to the border. Unfortunately, there are not enough towns around the border do it. Hence, we identify a causal effect with a partially linear model. We include an indicator for switch off towns, i.e. a discontinuous function of distance from the border, and a smooth polynomial of the distance in the RHS of our regression model.
The third identifying assumption is that there is no sorting across the border. In our setup, moving from East to West would make no sense, since households in the East can access digital TV before their switch off date (about 40% of them do so). Sorting from West to East would be a problem if Berlusconi supporters in the West were willing to relocate to ensure a few more months of accessing analog TV only, whose channels are also available on digital TV, which is largely implausible.
Standard errors. Treating standard errors correctly is particularly crucial in a spatial RDD framework, since residuals may be not only correlated at the treatment-control level, but also spatially. We correct standard errors in three ways: first we cluster them at the province level, i.e. the level at which quasi-experimental conditions are assigned. There are 8 provinces in Piedmont, thus standard errors are likely biased downwards. As a finite-sample correction, we multiply the error terms by
, where C is the number of clusters, when estimating the variance-covariance matrix. Also, we use critical values of a t-student distributed variable with C −1 degrees of freedom, instead of a standard normal, to establish test statistics significance. If using the rule of Donald and Lang (2007) , significance of all estimated coefficients does not change. Following Cameron and Miller (2011) , we alternatively account for the small number of clusters using a wild bootstrap methodology at the cluster level. These two frameworks assume that errors for towns in different provinces are uncorrelated. But towns close in space and in different provinces may have correlated errors. We thus provide a third set of standard errors based on the procedure of Conley (1999) , which allows for spatial dependence of unknown form.
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Weighting scheme. We use votes at the town level to compute electoral outcome variables. These data are plausibly more precise in large towns (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007) . Hence, we estimate Equation 1 using both OLS and weighted least squares, where weights are average logarithm of total voters in 2010 and 2005 elections.
25
Baseline covariates. Although a consistent estimate of the treatment effect does not require that we add baseline covariates to our specification, we do so in order to reduce the sampling variability in our estimator (see Lee and Lemieux [2010] We use a bandwith of 0.25 degrees in longitude and latitude, i.e. approximately 30 Km in each dimension. This gives more conservative standard errors than lower or higher bandwiths. In particular, here it is more conservative than using one degree, as in Dell et al. (forthcoming) and Dell (2010) , and of 3 degrees (200 miles), as in Kline and Moretti (2011) .
25 Weighing by absolute number of voters would give Turin a weight close to 20%, the second-largest Western town of 1.3%, and the median Piedmont town by size of 0.06%.
Elettorale at Consiglio Regionale del Piemonte. In addition, we add several controls for demographics at the town level. We use 2001 Census data diffused by Istat, which are the latest available before the introduction of digital TV in 2008, and more up-to-date demographics from several sources, as described in the Appendix.
V Estimation Results
Baseline Specifications. Figure IV The two specifications also have similar R 2 , i.e. both models explain the same portion of variation in the dependent variable. In columns (3) to (8), we only use observations close to the border. When we consider towns within 75Km and 50Km around the border, the coefficient of interest ranges between -4.8 and -5.5 percentage points. If we only consider towns within 25Km around the border, the drop in Berlusconi candidate vote share was about 6 percentage points higher in the West than in the East. Results do not change if we approximate for smooth effects of distance using a third degree polynomial (see Panel B). Here, coefficients on the indicator for treated towns range from -4.6 to -6.1 percentage points. All t-statistics are significant at the 5% level or lower. The effect is larger for towns 15 Km around the border (available upon request), with estimated coefficients ranging between -6 and -7 p.p., and standard errors between 1.2 to 1.7 p.p.
. We only have 6 clusters though, whose size is heavily unbalanced: two only contain 13 and 18 observations, while the largest one 119, i.e. about one third of the sample (334 observations). Reliable statistical inference is therefore hard.
Specification tests and Alternative Explanations. In Table III , we examine the robustness of results to various specifications of the empirical model and to alternative explanations. Please refer to the Internet Appendix for additional results. In each Panel,
we use the whole sample of Piedmont towns (columns (1) and (2)), as well as towns within 75Km, 50Km and 25Km around the border (columns (3) to (8)). Standard errors clustered at the province level and corrected as in Table 2 are reported below coefficients. 27 In Panel A, we consider the complete spatial structure of observations using a cubic polynomial in longitude and latitude. 28 Magnitude of coefficients and statistical significance are similar to those in Table II . 29 In Panel B, we propose an alternative correction of standard errors.
Two towns are in the same cluster if they belong to the same province and to the same decile of the per capita regional income distribution. This increases the number of clusters, reported below coefficients: we do not need to account for the non-convergence of clusters to their asymptotic distribution. As a downside, we assume that residuals for towns in the same province but belonging to different deciles of income per capita are uncorrelated.
The RD polynomial is cubic in distance from the border, thus coefficients and R 2 are those in Panel B of Table II . Standard errors are similar to those in Table II . In Panel C, we allow for heterogeneous treatment effects adding interactions of the dummy Switch off with the cubic distance polynomial. The estimated effect is one to two percentage points 27 Wild bootstrapped s.e. and spatial HAC s.e. give similar results as in Table 2 . 28 This specification was introduced by Dell (2010) . In her case, the boundary is a multidimensional discontinuity in longitude-latitude space. Our border is a mono-dimensional discontinuity. Yet, distance is high for towns in the North East (negative) and in the South West (positive), without a border segment at their latitude. Modeling the longitude-latitude structure of towns alleviates concerns that those towns have been wrongly accounted for in the monodimensional specification.
29 Longitude-latitude polynomials of degree one and two to address concerns of overfitting at the discontinuity give similar results.
lower than in previous specifications, unless we limit the analysis to towns within 25Km around the border. In Panel D, we provide results for a difference-in-difference estimator, without exploiting the spatial dimension of the data. As in Panel C, some coefficients are smaller than those estimated in baseline specifications, but differences disappear in towns 25Km around the border. Statistical significance is unaffected. Finally, we estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) using a nearest-neighbor matching estimator based on the propensity score. In the last three Panels of 31 Since we artificially create a discontinuity in the distance dimension, we do not add a distance polynomial.
Placebo Analysis. If the effect we document in Table II is due to the switch to digital TV, we should observe no effect of being a town in Western Piedmont on Berlusconi candidate performance in earlier elections. In Table IV , column (1) and (2) We find no effect of being a Western town on the change in vote share of Berlusconi party between 2009 and 2004 EU elections.
Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008) , we propose a spatial placebo analysis using artificial borders. If our interpretation of the treatment is correct, we should find no effect when estimating Equation 1 using an artificial border within Western Piedmont and looking at Western towns only. In columns (5) and (6), we set the artificial border at 50 Km from the true one. All towns to the west of it are assigned to an artificial treatment condition, all towns to the east (and to the west of the true border) to an artificial control condition. 36 We find no effect of being an artificial treatment town on the change of Berlusconi candidate vote share. 37 Analogously, in columns (7) and (8) 36 In Imbens and Lemieux (2008) the artificial border is set at the median distance from the true border in both directions. Results do not change if we do so. 37 We only have two provinces here, so clustering at the province level is not sensible. The coefficient in column (6), Panel B is not small in magnitude. The related statistic is insignificant though.
only consider towns in Eastern Piedmont, and set an artificial border at 50 Km from the real border. Again, we find no effect of being in the artificial treatment group. 
VI Interpretations
Magnitude of the effect. The probability of accessing digital TV in Western Piedmont as of March 2010 was close to one, but about 40% of households in the East were also accessing digital TV. To back out the overall effect of switching to digital TV on election outcomes, we divide estimated coefficients by the difference in the probability of being exposed to the treatment across conditions, i.e. 0.6. 39 To estimate a lower and an upper bound, we use coefficients in the weighted least squares model using the full sample with linear distance polynomial (Table 2 , Panel A, column (2)) and for the plain diff-in-diff estimator (Table 3 , Panel D, column (2) (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) .
Bayesian interpretations. We now discuss plausible Bayesian interpretations for the results in Table II .
Negative news omission. The bias towards Berlusconi may consist in omitting negative information about him or his party. This would drive our results if, after moving to digital TV, individuals sorted into sources of information they were not accessing before.
They may get to know facts about Berlusconi or his party they had not been aware of previously. In the Internet Appendix, we show that individuals who move to new digital TV sort into non-news programs, as graphically emphasized by Panel B of section III.
39 Coefficients should be divided by the difference in the limit of this probability when distance approaches zero from both sides. We assume that digital TV is homogenously diffused in the East. We have no data to infer the ratio of households accessing digital TV at the province level. (Untabulated) statistics for plausible predictors of switching before the deadline, such as the ratio of elderly, the ratio of youngsters, the ratio of college educated inhabitants, and the historical support for Berlusconi party, do not differ substantially across Eastern provinces.
We also show that after moving to digital TV, treated individuals do not sort into other sources of information, such as newspapers or news websites on the internet.
Positive news omission. There might be positive information about Mr Berlusconi or his candidate after the switch off. Those on digital TV would be less exposed to it. But then, Table V ).
Campaign Advertising on digital TV. Due to the large number of new channels on digital TV, the costs of TV advertising may drop. Opposition parties or local interest groups may run aggressive anti-Berlusconi advertisement on new digital channels more easily.
But in Italy, political ads have been banned since 1999.
Overlapping generations.
Observed long-run persuasion could be driven by new generations who start to be exposed to the bias and to take part to collective decision-making continuously. Voting in Italy is allowed to all citizens (not immigrants) who are 18 years old. Anyone who was allowed to vote in 2010 had been exposed to the bias for 16 years. Conversely, no one born after 1994, when Berlusconi created his party, voted in 2010. Coarse Thinking. Following the intuition of Mullainathan et al. (2008) , over the years individuals may have unconsciously associated good feelings from watching TV shows to Berlusconi, who was extensively covered in news programs. This explanation is consistent with results if individuals had limited memory. If they had not, once exposed to the same shows as in the past, they would recall the association with Berlusconi and still be willing to go vote for him. This interpretation is similar to the drop in interest for politics of viewers unexposed to news proposed by (Gentzkow, 2006) and Prior (2005) , which requires that Berlusconi supporters are more likely to sort into digital TV than others. Hence, we should expect a larger effect in towns with higher historical support for Berlusconi. But the effect we document is stronger in towns with lower historical support (see section VI).
Selective Attention. Schwartzstein (2012) proposes a model of selective attention to freely available information which may produce persistently biased beliefs. After an attention shock, agents need time to learn which sources of information to attend to in this setting.
If we interpret moving to digital TV as a shock to information voters attend to, selective attention implies that the debiasing process is slow. Not that our evidence implies that voting behavior changed no more than five months after the shock.
Persuasion Bias. DellaVigna and Kaplan (2006) show how a Bayesian and a persuasionbiased agents form beliefs when exposed to systematically biased information. Over time, a Bayesian agent is exposed to a high enough number of signals to filter out the bias in full.
A persuasion-biased agent systematically fails to take the extent of bias into account: she will never filter it out in full. While exposed to the bias, she is systematically convinced to vote for Berlusconi. Once exposure drops, she is not persuaded to go and vote for him anymore. This process needs not be conscious: a viewer needs not realize she was exposed to a bias to change her behavior.
VII Who is systematically persuaded?
Demographics and information processing. We investigate which demographic groups are persuaded the most over time.
Two dimensions seem most relevant: potential cognitive biases, and the extent of bias exposure before the shock. In the Internet Appendix, we show that individuals aged 60 or higher are more likely than other demographics to watch TV every day. At the same time, aging of the brain has been shown to worsen cognitive abilities. 42 We test the hypothesis that elderly are less likely to filter out biases over time. We sort Piedmont towns by the ratio of elderly (individuals aged 64 or higher) over the whole population. We create 42 For an exhaustive review, see Craik and Salthouse (2008) . a dummy, High, which equals one if a town is above the top tercile of the distribution of ratio of elderly. Low is a dummy which equals one if a town is below the bottom tercile. In columns (1) and (2) of Table V , we augment the RHS of Equation 1 with the dummies, their interactions with treatment condition, and the ratio of elderly over total population. The interaction between high ratio of elderly and treatment condition is negative and statistically significant, both when using the whole sample of towns or those within 50Km around the border. In treated towns where the ratio of elderly is high, Berlusconi candidate vote share dropped by 2.3 percentage points more than in others.
As a placebo corroboration, we sort Piedmont towns by the ratio of people aged 16 to 24 over total population. Young voters are not more exposed to TV than others (see Internet Appendix), and should have similar cognitive abilities to other non-elderly. In columns (3) and (4), we augment the RHS of Equation 1 adding High and Low dummies for the top and bottom tercile of the ratio of youngsters distribution, as well as their interactions with the treatment condition and the level of youngsters ratio. We find no different effect in towns with high or low ratios of young voters compared to other treated towns.
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To disentangle the effect of extent of exposure from cognitive abilities, we look at education. High and low education people are similarly exposed to TV [Istat] . But less educated individuals may have lower cognitive abilities. In columns (5) and (6) of Table V , we sort towns by the ratio of college educated people over total population, and define analogous dummies and interactions as above. In towns with less educated individuals, the effect of moving to digital TV is 1.8 to 2.1 percentage points larger than in other towns. This effect is less statistically robust than for elderly, but magnitudes are similar. The dummies for high percentage of elderly and low percentage of educated people are not highly correlated (0.1512, p < 1%). We look at the double interaction between top and bottom thirds for ratio of elderly and top and bottom thirds for ratio of college educated individuals in a town. We should expect the effect to be stronger in towns with most elderly and least educated voters than in other treated towns. (Untabulated) results show that in the former towns Berlusconi candidate vote share was 5.7 percentage points lower than corresponding towns in the control area (s.e. 0.013), on top of a baseline effect on -2.5 percentage points in other treated towns.
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We interpret the mediating role of elderly and less educated voters on the effect of a drop to bias exposure on voting behavior as evidence that cognitive abilities are important to explain why individuals can be systematically persuaded over time.
From 2008 onwards, Berlusconi has been known for sexual scandals. Voters support may drop if sensitive to these topics, and some demographics may be more sensitive than others. To test this channel, we look at social capital: the higher the social capital in a town, the more people are possibly concerned with ethical and moral conduct of politicians, the less likely they would support Berlusconi after 2008. It is hard to find a good proxy for social capital at the town level. In columns (7) and (8) Enikolopov et al. (2011) , who document a short-run effect of availability of NTV in Russia on voting behavior. In the short run, all voters may be affected by a bias, hence an econometrician should not expect to find any significant mediating role of demographics. In our setting, we should find mediating effects of demographics if certain groups are more likely to be systematically persuaded than others.
45 Guiso et al. (2008) use the number of non-profit organizations as a proxy. (Non)results are robust to using a dummy equal to one if a blood donation station exists in a town (Guiso et al., 2004) , or the change in recycling over per capita income from 2005 to 2009. added to lower bias exposure in changing beliefs about Berlusconi party of the former.
How many agents are systematically persuaded? 95% of Italians were exposed to Berlusconi bias before the introduction of digital TV. How many of them were systematically persuaded over time? We compute the dissuasion rate, i.e. the share of people who, after moving to new digital channels, were dissuaded from voting for Berlusconi candidate in 2010. 46 The dissuasion rate can be interpreted as a lower bound for the fraction of voters who are systematically persuaded.
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The 2010 vote share of Berlusconi candidate, b j , with j = S,S for treated and untreated towns, respectively, is defined as follows: 
where nv = 1−t 05 is the ratio of non-voters in 2005. The interpretation of f carries on from 46 Similar to the persuasion rate in DellaVigna and , this rate estimates the ratio of people less exposed to a bias who are persuaded to change their behavior.
47 It is a lower bound because non-Berlusconi voters may be persuaded by other biases we do not capture in our analysis. nonvoters. The second term corrects for changes in turnout after the move to digital TV.
We estimate f using results from section V and Auditel audience data. For b S −bS, we use a high and low bound from our estimations ofγ in Table II , Panel A, column (2), which refers to the linear distance polynomial when observations are weighted, and in Table III Eventually, we estimate that the dissuasion rate is f ∈ (29.9%, 40.8%).
At least 30% of those less exposed to Berlusconi bias were dissuaded from voting for his candidate in 2010. 49 This implies that at least 30% of voters were systematically persuaded by biased information over the years. As expected, the magnitude is lower than the negative persuasion rate of Enikolopov et al. (2011) , 50 who find that being exposed to NTV convinces 66% of viewers not to vote for the government party, Unity.
VIII Understanding the debiasing mechanism
In the Internet Appendix, we show that the vote share of Berlusconi candidate's main opponent has slightly increased after the shock. Third party shares were unaffected. A scenario where all 2005 Berlusconi supporters voted in 2010, and some of them chose other parties, is inconsistent with this evidence. Therefore, we look at the effect of the shock on turnout to understand how lower exposure to bias affected voting.
Effect on turnout. In Table VI 52
Column (1) shows that turnout has not changed differently in switch off towns compared to other towns. 53 In column (2), we add interactions of the treatment with dummies which equal one if a town is above the top tercile or below the bottom tercile for ratio of elderly over total population. From Table V , we know that the shock to bias exposure had the strongest effect in towns with more elderly. Column (2) shows that turnout has dropped significantly more in those towns. Columns (3) to (5) use towns 75Km, 50Km
and 25Km around the border. Exception made for column (4), the drop in turnout is significantly higher in treated towns with most elderly than other treated towns. The difference between change in turnout for towns in the middle and high old ratio groups is more negative for treated than control towns. The mean ratio of elderly in oldest treated 50 Their bias consists of negative propaganda against the government party. In our case, treated voters are less exposed to a positive bias.
51 Results are similar if we use the ratio of voters over voting age population. 52 In the Internet Appendix, we show that youngest towns voted more for a new party which ran an aggressive internet campaign. Turnout has likely increased there. Voter turnout has also been used as a proxy for social capital (Guiso et al., 2004) 53 Turnout has dropped everywhere. The average 2010-2005 change in turnout in Piedmont was -9.9 percent (s.d. 7.7 percent). Grey and black points are interpreted as above. In towns with few college-educated voters, there is a mass of black points in the switch off area which is not observed in control towns.
In the Internet Appendix, we show that this mechanism is consistent with voting behavior in all other Italian regions. The relationships between historical support and effect of shock to bias exposure, and digital TV usage and effect of shock are also shown to be consistent across all Italian regions.
IX Conclusions
We Our results imply that policies should be implemented to help individuals, and the most vulnerable demographics in particular, filter out biases in information over time. Examples are voters exposed to biased political information, investors exposed to biased analysts forecasts, or patients exposed to biased treatment recommendations. In our setting, persuasion survived over time even if all Italians were aware that Berlusconi controlled most TV channels. Mandating disclosure of conflicts of interest is therefore not a sufficient provision. In the case of TV, protection of systematically persuaded agents should add to the rights of free speech and minority representation in motivating antitrust provisions.
Apart from Italy, this is at odds with recent developments in several countries, such as Results imply that TV has been crucial to create and maintain political consensus towards
Berlusconi over the years.
Finally, implications of these results go beyond the scope of economic research. If long-run persuasion is due to cognitive biases, is it fair to exploit it? Or may this conduct even constitute grounds for criminal allegations? Are elections a satisfactory source of power legitimization in countries where information is systematically biased? Which interventions to protect vulnerable groups are legitimate, and which excessively intrusive of free will and determination of individuals? This paper has barely scratched the surface of issues that await to be dissected by researchers in many disciplines.
Appendix
In this section, we define variables which we labeled Electoral controls and Socio-demographic controls in the paper. All variables are observed at the town level unless otherwise specified. Since our identification is based on a regression discontinuity design, we provide evidence that observable factors other than the treatment condition vary smoothly across the boundary in Table VII .
Electoral controls are computed from data published by Osservatorio Regionale at Consiglio Regionale del Piemonte. They include:
• Precints: number of electoral precints in a town. This variable proxies for the size of towns. We prefer this to total population which would correlate with other variables in the RHS.
• ∆ Berlusconi 05-00 : change in Berlusconi candidate vote share between 2005 and 2000 Regional Elections.
• ∆ Berlusconi 00-95 : change in Berlusconi candidate vote share between 2000 and 1995 Regional Elections.
• • Share Berlusconi Prov. pre10 : share of Berlusconi candidate vote share in the closest Province Presidential elections before 2010. Rules for Province elections are similar to Regional elections: voters pick a candidate to the office of Province President. They can also express a preference for one candidate in a party list to enter the province Parliament.
• ∆ csx 05-00 : change in center-left candidate (main opponent) vote share between 2005 and 2000 Regional Elections.
• ∆ csx 00-95 : change in center-left candidate (main opponent) vote share between 2000 and 1995 Regional Elections.
Socio-demographic controls are taken from the 2001 Census run by Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (Istat) or other sources, which we specify below. They include:
• //www.ruparpiemonte.it/inf ostat/index.jsp)
• ∆ milk prod quotas 10-08 : change in EU milk production quotas (in liters) assigned
to Piedmont farms at the province level. Milk production quotas have been an important issue for local elections in Piedmont over the last years.
• • Arci: dummy equal to one is an Arci club exist in town, i.e. leftish meeting points for elderly and youngsters. These clubs often represent the only meeting point in small towns. (Associazione Ricreativa e Culturale Italiana Piemonte, available at http : //www.arcipiemonte.it/af f iliati piemonte)
• Acli : dummy equal to one is an Acli club exist in town, i.e. catholic meeting points for elderly and youngsters. These clubs often represent the only meeting Change in Turnout (10-05)
. 
Each observation is a town in Piedmont. In Panel A the RDD polynomial in the distance of a town from the border is linear. In Panel B, it is cubic. Switch off is a dummy variable which equals one for treated towns, zero otherwise. Columns report results for the Full Sample, and for limiting the analysis to towns within 75Km, 50Km and 25Km from the border. In even columns, observations are weighted by the average of the log of voters in 2010 and 2005 Elections. For each specification, three sets of standard errors are reported. Clust. province s.e. are clustered at the province level (8 clusters), and corrected as suggested by Cameron and Miller (2011) . Wild bootstrap s.e. follow the procedure suggested by Cameron and Miller (2011) . Columns (1) to (6) are based on 900 repetitions of bootstraps, while columns (7) and (8) on 100 repetitions. Spatial HAC s.e. allow for spatial dependence of unknown form following Conley (1999) . Significance is as follows: *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
Each observation is a town in Piedmont. Switch off is a dummy variable which equals one for treated towns, zero otherwise. Columns report results for the Full Sample, and for limiting the analysis to towns within 75Km, 50Km and 25Km from the border. In even columns, observations are weighted by the average of the log of voters in 2010 and 2005. Except for Panel B, standard errors are clustered at the province level (8 clusters), and corrected as in Cameron and Miller (2011) for downward bias. Significance is as follows: *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
Each observation is a town in Piedmont. In columns (1) and (2) (5) and (6)) and control ( (7) and (8)) groups, as suggested in Imbens and Lemieux (2008) . Switch off is a dummy variable which equals one for treated towns, zero otherwise. In even columns the analysis is limited to towns within 50Km from the border in both directions. In all columns, observations are weighted by the average of the log of voters in 2010 and 2005. Cluster prov. standard errors are clustered at the province level (8 clusters), and corrected as in Cameron and Miller (2011) for downward bias. Spatial HAC s.e. allow for spatial dependence of unknown form following Conley (1999) . Significance is as follows: *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
Each observation is a town in Piedmont. Switch off is a dummy variable which equals one for treated towns, zero otherwise. Columns (1) and (2) focus on interactions of treatment effect with the ratio of elderly in a town, i.e. the ratio of individuals aged 61 or higher over the total population. Switchoff*Top 3 is one if a town is in the treatment group and above the top tercile of towns sorted by ratio of elderly, zero otherwise. Switchoff*Low is one if a town is in the treatment group and below the lowest tercile of towns sorted by ratio of elderly, zero otherwise. Columns (3) and (4) repeat the same exercise for the ratio of youngsters, i.e. individuals aged between 16 and 24. Columns (5) and (6) repeat it for the ratio of individuals who hold a graduate degree over total population. Columns (7) and (8) repeat it for the ratio of individuals who are employed in not-for-profit companies over total population. Columns (9) and (10) repeat it for the average of Berlusconi candidate vote share in 2005, 2000 and 1995 regional elections. Odd columns report results for the Full Sample. In even columns the analysis is limited to towns within 50Km from the border. In all columns, observations are weighted by the average of the log of voters in 2010 and 2005. Cluster prov. standard errors are clustered at the province level (8 clusters), and corrected as in Cameron and Miller (2011) for downward bias. Wild bootstrap s.e. follow the procedure suggested by Cameron and Miller (2011) . Significance is as follows: *10%, **5%, ***1%. Each observation is a town in Piedmont. In all columns, the dependent variable is the change in the log of voters between 2010 and 2005 Piedmont Regional Elections. Switch off is a dummy variable which equals one for treated towns, zero otherwise. Switchoff*H. Old is one if a town is in the treatment group and above the top tercile of towns sorted by ratio of elderly, zero otherwise. Switchoff*L. Old is one if a town is in the treatment group and below the bottom tercile of towns sorted by ratio of elderly, zero otherwise. The RDD polynomial is cubic in the distance from the border. S.e. are clustered at the province level (8 clusters), and corrected for downward bias as in Cameron and Miller (2011) . Significance is as follows: *10%, **5%, ***1%. 
